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FOR WANT OF A NAIL:
FORFEITURE AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS*
STEVEN L. KESSLER**

For the past thirty-six months, some federal courts have leveled sharp
criticism against federal prosecutors for their use, or, more appropriately,
abuse, of the federal civil forfeiture statutes. 1 Most of the criticism has
focused upon the government's use of the forfeiture provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 881, the primary federal civil drug forfeiture statute.
The government has had seemingly unfettered authority when it comes
to civil forfeiture. After all, the property subject to forfeiture usually is
owned by those nameless, faceless "drug dealers" who, as we, the people,
often say, have no rights anyway. Or shouldn't. Greed, however, is still

one of the seven deadly sins. Since 1985, the federal government has
pocketed more than $3.2 billion in forfeited assets. 2 In its current

inventory, the federal government has more than 31,698 pieces of
property, real and personal, worth an estimated $1.9 billion.'

From the

business of the mechanic who repaired the drug dealer's cars to the
*

0 Copyright by Steven L. Kessler 1994.

** Partner in the Law Offices of Steven L. Kessler and of counsel to Kessler &
Kessler in Manhattan. Portions of this article are adapted from STEVEN L. KESSLER,
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE: FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE (1993 & Supp.

1994).
1. See, e.g., United States v. $31,990, 982 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
that the government "abused" civil forfeiture by relying on an "unrealistic" drug courier
profile to support the seizure under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)); United States v. Lasanta,
978 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the government's argument that it can
seize property without a warrant in a civil forfeiture and stating that such a "relentless
and imaginative" use of forfeiture would "leave the constitution itself a casualty");
United States v. Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 902-04 (2d Cir.
1992) (chastising the government for failing to use a "less-intrusive" action than seizing
all the company's assets), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993); United States v. 461
Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (stating that "[tihe generic
brief filed by the United States seems designed to justify 90% of all forfeitures," calling
the government's actions "unfair" and "excessive," and granting summary judgment in
favor of the property). See generally STEvEN L. KESSLER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
FORFEITURE: FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE (1993 & Supp. 1994); Steven L. Kessler,
Tide Is Turning in FederalForfeitureRulings, N.Y. L.J., March 5, 1993 at 1.
2. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR AssEr FORFEITURE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR

1993, at 16 (1994).
3. Id. at 20.
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$50,000 house occupied by the welfare wife and seven-year-old daughter
while hubby/daddy serves a life sentence, forfeiture has become, well,
routine. And, as with anything routine, comes an insensitivity about the

plight of a person caught in a "labeling" process. In forfeiture actions,
those claiming an interest in or ownership of the subject property lose
their individual characteristics to those of the label, usually that of
"criminal," "friend of drug dealer" or the like. Thus, a forfeiture which,

if reviewed dispassionately, might not be pursued, becomes so routine that
its initiators see nothing improper in its implementation. The "routine use
of forfeited assets by prosecutors to fill their agency's coffers raises

serious conflict-of-interest questions and, more fundamentally, undermines
confidence in the integrity of their decision making."4
Most individuals would find it offensive for the government to take in
forfeiture a $25,000 yacht because one marijuana cigarette was found at
the bottom of the ship's laundry hamper.5 Most would undoubtedly find

taking an individual's property without at least some evidence of the
owner's guilt of a crime at least somewhat troublesome. Concerns even
have arisen in Congress, where opposition to governmental forfeiture

tactics has found support from such unlikely bedfellows as conservative
Republican Henry J.Hyde of Illinois, liberal Democrat John Conyers, Jr.

of Michigan, and the American Civil Liberties Union.6
Both
Congressmen recently introduced legislation to curb seizures and make it
more difficult for prosecutors to forfeit an individual's property.' Yet,

4. Vito J. Titone, CurtailUse of Civil Forfeiture, N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1993, at 2.
5. Such a forfeiture was upheld in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
6. Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. RnV. 95,
115, 117-19 (1994).
7. Rep. Hyde introduced the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 2417,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which modifies the existing statutes in seven ways. The
bill (1) switches the burden of proof from the property owner to the government to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the property is guilty; (2) provides for appointing
counsel to indigents; (3) gives more protection to innocent property owners; (4)
eliminates the cost bond requirement; (5) extends the time to challenge a forfeiture from
10 to 60 days; (6) creates a remedy for property damage caused by government
negligence; and (7) allows for the release of property before the final disposition of the
case. See generally George Fishman, Civil Asset ForfeitureReform: The Agenda Before
Congress, 39 N.Y.L. Sc. L. REv. 121 (1994).
Rep. Conyers introduced the Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, H.R. 3347, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993). The proposal is a culmination of his investigation, which included two
sets of hearings. Conyers found "a pattern and practice of abuse" by "state and local
law enforcement that is fostered by a federal program with a built-in financial incentive
that cannot help but impact law enforcement priorities," and included within his
legislative proposal comprehensive due process and oversight protections for individuals
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until only recently, the courts had rejected most challenges to the federal
forfeiture provisions. They had upheld the government's argument that

forfeiture is civil and remedial, thereby not falling within the scope of the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive and disproportionate fines

and penalties. 8

Because, the argument went, civil forfeiture is

traditionally in rem, directed against the "guilty" or "offending" property,

it is not punitive and, therefore, falls outside the scope of the prohibitions
of the Eighth Amendment. No more.
subject to civil forfeiture and suggestions for the redistribution of seized assets. See
Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation andNationalSecurity of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) (opening statement of John Conyers, Jr., Chairman).
The bill (1) prohibits the forfeiture of property unless the owner has been convicted
of a crime upon which the forfeiture is based, thereby abolishing in rem forfeiture
proceedings; (2) alters the relation-back doctrine to vest title to the subject property in
the government only after a verdict in favor of the government, see United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993); (3) requires that the value of the seized
property be equal to or less than the value of the property involved in the offense; see
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); (4) requires, in most cases, an
adversarial hearing prior to property seizures, see United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993); (5) places time limitations upon the government;
(6) raises to clear and convincing the requisite standard of proof, see Department of Law
Enforcementv. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991); (7) follows many state courts
and establishes the right to a jury trial and adequate legal representation in civil forfeiture
cases; (8) prohibits the forfeiture of any property which has been paid or pledged to pay
attorney's fees, see Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); and (9)
addresses other policy issues, such as adoptive seizures, distribution of forfeited assets,
governmental use and payment of informants and damage claims by victims of civil
forfeiture proceedings. For a critique of H.R. 3347, see Fishman, supra, at 141-47.
For an overview of Representative Hyde's theories relating to forfeiture, see HENRY J.
HYDE, FORFErThNG OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: Is YouR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIzuRE?
(1995); see also KESSLER, supra note 1, § 1.07.
8. U.S CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments infficted."); see, e.g., United States
v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not apply to forfeiture actions brought under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 954 (1989); United States v. 250 Kreag Rd., 739 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(same); United States v. 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp. 495, 498 (N.D. 111. 1989)
(stating that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to forfeiture actions under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)); United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-14 (E.D.N.C. 1988)
(holding forfeiture under2l U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) does not violate the Eighth Amendment),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
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I. AUSTIN V. UNTIED STATES
By a vote of 9-0, the United States Supreme Court finally called a
spade a spade. The Court deemed forfeiture a punishment. 9 Thus,
seizures and forfeitures may no longer be so disproportionate to the
underlying illicit activity that they violate the constitutional ban on
excessive fines." There must now be some relationship between the
gravity of an offense and the property seized.
InAustin v. United States, a South Dakota auto-bod shop owner sold
two grams of cocaine to an undercover federal agent.' A search of the
body shop following the arrest revealed a small amount of drugs and
approximately $4000 in cash. 12 The shop owner pled guilty to
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.13 For his efforts, the shop
owner lost his business and his mobile home, worth more than $38,000,
to the government in forfeiture."' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reluctantly upheld the forfeiture action, stating "we
are troubled by the Government's view that any property, whether it be
a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the
Government because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal
record, engages in a single drug transaction." 15
Judge Floyd R. Gibson, writing for a unanimous bench, expressed the
court's opinion that "the Government is exacting too high a penalty in
relation to the offense committed."
Nevertheless, the court found that
precedent bound it to disregard the disproportionality argument under the
Eighth Amendment in the context of civil forfeiture. 7
9. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), rev'g United States v. 508
Depot St., 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2766 (1993) (holding that, in RICO statute actions, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause bars criminal forfeitures that are disproportionate to the amounts of criminal
proceeds).
10. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 2803.
Id.
Id.
See id.
United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 817.
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The Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, echoed
Judge Gibson's concerns.18 The Court found that the Eighth Amendment
applied to both civil and criminal proceedings and that, both throughout
history and today, forfeiture statutes were intended, at least in part, to
punish the owner of the "offending" property. 19 Focusing upon
forfeiture's effect on the property owner rather than the civil/criminal
nature of the provision, the Court, for the first time, set a constitutional
limitation on the government's power and authority to seize property.'
Most would characterize these conclusions as obvious. Of course
forfeiture punishes the property owner. Remarkably, however, the
Supreme Court had never so held.21 Because civil forfeiture is based
upon the legal fiction of guilty property, the owner or individual with an

interest in the property has been given status only as a claimant, whose
innocence is usually irrelevant and who bears virtually all of the burdens
of proof. In fact, the rationale behind the civil/criminal dichotomy is
twisted. "It [defies] common sense to prohibit disproportionate forfeiture
of the property of a defendant who has been convicted of a criminal
violation while placing no limits on the power of the government to seize
any real estate related to an offense in an ostensibly civil in rem

action."'

If the property really is the offender, then there is no reason

to consider the conduct of the property owner. As one district court put
18. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2802. Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter
joined Justice Blackmun in his opinion. Id. Justice Scalia signed a separate concurrence.
See id. at 2812-15. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, filed a second concurring opinion. See id. at 2815-16.
19. The Justices disagreed as to the history and relevance of the historical fiction
of in rem proceedings. See id. at 2808-09, 2813-15.
20. Id. at 2811-12.
21. The obvious had been expressed by only a handful of lower courts. See United
States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (criminal forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 1853 is a form of punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment); United States
v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (forfeiture provisions of RICO are
meant to be punitive); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 457-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (criminal forfeiture under RICO is "punishment"); see also United
States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 807-12 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., dissenting in part)
("[C]ivil forfeitures are punitive in nature."); United States v. On Leong Chinese
Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 52 (1991).
22. On Leong Chinese Merchants, 918 F.2d at 1299 (Cudahy, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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it: "This would indicate that at the edges, at least, the in rem fiction
begins to break down."'
Justice Blackmun questioned the use of forfeiture's legal fiction as a
matter of constitutional law. "If forfeiture had been understood not to
punish the owner, there would have been no reason to reserve the case of
a truly innocent owner. Indeed, it is only on the assumption that
forfeiture serves in part to punish that the Court's past reservation of that
question makes sense."'
The Court concluded:
[E]ven though this Court has rejected the "innocence" of the
owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture, it consistently has
recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the
owner. More recently, we have noted that forfeiture serves
"punitive and deterrent purposes," and "imposes an economic
penalty." We conclude, therefore, that forfeiture generally and
statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been
understood, at least in part, as punishment. 25
Thus, remedial objectives alone do not discount the possibility that a civil
forfeiture also may serve the additional punitive objectives of retribution
and deterrence.
The Court left for lower court interpretation and, no doubt, future
Court interpretation, a test to determine the excessiveness and
disproportionate nature of a forfeiture.' In his concurrence, however,
Justice Scalia said that the "relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture
under § 881 is the relationship of the property to the offense: Was it close
enough to render the property, under traditional standards, 'guilty' and
hence forfeitable?"' It remains to be seen if this becomes the test used
by the courts, or if some hybrid balancing of the value and use of the
property becomes the norm.
Justice Scalia also questioned the Court's focus on the property
owner's culpability in determining whether forfeiture is punitive.
Following an extensive discussion of the differences between in rem and
23. United States v. 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp. 495, 498 n.2 (N.D. IlL.
1989).
24. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993). Both sections of the
statute in question, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7), contain "innocent owner" exemptions.
25. Id. at 2810 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 686, 687 (1974)) (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 2812 ("Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that
question in the first instance.").
27. Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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in personam forfeiture as they relate to the punishment," he raised an

interesting point: "If the Court is correct that culpability of the owner is
essential, then there is no difference (except perhaps the burden of proof)
between the 9traditional in rem forfeiture and the traditional in personam
forfeiture. "
According to Justice Scalia, the offense of which the owner/claimant
has been convicted is not relevant to the forfeiture.
Section 881 requires only that the Government show probable
cause that the subject property was used for the prohibited
purpose. The burden then shifts to the property owner to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the use was made
without his "knowledge, consent, or willful blindness," or that
the property was not so used. Unlike monetary fines, statutory
in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by
determining the appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the
committed offense, but by determining what property has been
"tainted" by unlawful use, to which issue the value of the
property is irrelevant. Scales used to measure out unlawful drug
sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the purest
gold or the basest metal. But an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the
traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment permits if it applies
to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality
of the offense-the building, for example, in which an isolated
drug sale happens to occur. Such a confiscation would be an
excessive fine. The question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a
close enough relationship to the offense.'
Although leaving his answer for another time, Justice Kennedy was
troubled by the issue of whether forfeiture would be permitted when the
property owner committed no wrong of any sort, intentional or negligent,
saying: "That for me would raise a serious question." 3 ' He also
reserved judgment on whether an in rem forfeiture would always amount
to an intended punishment of the owner of the forfeited property.'
28.
29.
30.
(quoting

Id. at 2812-14 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(c)) (citations omitted).

31. Id. at 2816 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
32. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Interestingly, before Austin was announced, the Northern District of
New York struck down, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a
forfeiture of a family residence based on a forty-five dollar, seven-gram
marijuana sale on the premises and another six ounces of marijuana found
inside the home.33 Analyzing the facts before it, and using the threeprong test enunciated by the Second Circuit in United States v. 38 Whalers
Cove Drive,3 the court in United States v. 835 Seventh Street,31 deemed

forfeiture of the claimant's $69,778 equity in the home "clearly
disproportionate," bordering on "aberrational," and in excess of any

legitimate civil purpose for the forfeiture.' Because the law required
forfeiture of all or nothing, the court erred on the side of protecting the
owner's constitutional rights and dismissed the forfeiture action rather than
overcompensate the government for implementing the drug laws.37
In 835 Seventh Street, the issue was forfeiture of the claimant's
home.3 8 Thus, the court's disallowance of the entire forfeiture may have
had something to do with a homestead-type analysis. At least five states
have so held.39

33. United States v. 835 Seventh St., 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); cf. In re
Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that drug tax levied subsequent to
a criminal prosecution is deemed punishment and violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Filth Amendment).
34. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992). In 38 Whalers Cove
Drive, the court invoked the test used by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290-92 (1983), to determine whether the forfeiture was so disproportionate to the
crime that it violated the Eighth Amendment. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 38.
The 38 Whalers Cove Drive court weighed: (1) the inherent seriousness and gravity of
the crime; (2) sentences imposed within the jurisdiction for the underlying crime; and (3)
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the offense. Id. at 38-39. The 38 Whalers
Cove Drive court upheld the forfeiture given its fact pattern; the 835 Seventh Street court
did not.
35. 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
36. Id. at 694.
37. Id. at 696-97; see also United States v. 318 S. Third St., 988 F.2d 822, 828
(8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the court has discretion to dismiss a forfeiture for gambling
under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 if the forfeiture would be a disproportionate penalty, but may
not subdivide the property to create a proportional forfeiture).
38. 835 Seventh St., 820 F. Supp at 689.
39. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the state
civil forfeiture provision violated the state constitution's homestead provision); People
v. 1403 E. Parham St., 621 N.E.2d 1026 (111.App. Ct. 1993) (same); In re Bly, 456
N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1990) (same); Kansas ar rel. Braun v. Tract of Land in the Northwest
Quarter of Section Four, 840 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1992) (same); State ex rel. Means v. 10
Acres of Land, 877 P.2d 597 (Okla. 1994) (same) (relying heavily upon State ex rel.
McCoy v. Lot 1, Block 7, 831 P.2d 1008 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992)).
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In addition, the 835 Seventh Street court used as part of its analysis

the federal sentencing guidelines and the range, especially relating to the
fines the defendant would have been subject to in the underlying criminal
case.' Because of the discrepancy between this range and the penalty

of forfeiture, the court dismissed the government's forfeiture action in
full."' The tests used by the district court may be a starting point for the
test left open by the Austin Court.
A. The Impact of Austin
With the Supreme Court having overcome its fixation that civil

forfeiture is remedial in nature, Austin probably will instill an element of
moderation in the prosecution of forfeiture cases. Extreme and weaker
cases, such as "drive-by" cocaine sales,42 probably will be dropped, with
the government concentrating its efforts on those properties with a greater

nexus and financial correlation to the underlying criminal activity. That,
of course, assumes the government sees the errors of some of its ways. In

a statement predicting victory in the circuit court, the Department of
Justice said that it anticipated "no significant change in day-to-day
operations. "I "The department has exercised restraint in enforcing civil
forfeiture laws and will continue to do so."' So much for the leopard
and his spots. One thing is for certain, however: The Court's decision
will encourage more challenges to the government's seizure and forfeiture

procedures.

It also is clear that United States v. Halpel4 5 now applies in
forfeiture cases. In Halper, the Supreme Court addressed what it

characterized as an unresolved problem: "whether and under what
40. 835 Seventh St., 820 F. Supp. at 694.
41. See id. at 694, 697.
42. In these cases, the government seizes an automobile where its only connection
to a crime is its use to transport its owner to the location where the owner purchased
narcotics. Those cases in which the car is used to transport or import narcotics probably
will not be affected.
43. Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment, N.Y. L.J., July 26,
1993, at 1, 4 (quoting a statement from the U.S. Department of Justice issued while
Austin was pending before the Eighth Circuit).
44. This despite the results of a 10-month study by The PittsburghPressfinding that
80% of people who lost property to the federal government were never charged with a
crime. The study also found that most seized items were not yachts and other luxury
goods belonging to drug lords but rather modest homes, cars, and savings accounts of
ordinary people. Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Government Seizures Victimize
Innocent, PflT. PRESS, Aug. 11, 1991, at Al, A8.
45. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for the purpose
of the Double Jeopardy Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]."' In Halper,
a civil defendant alleged that he could not be prosecuted for a "civil"
violation of the federal False Claims Ace after he had already been
criminally prosecuted for the same conduct as a criminal false-claims
offender under 18 U.S.C. § 287.1 The Supreme Court agreed.49
In reaching its conclusion, the Halper Court declined to follow the
government's contention that "punishment" in the relevant sense is meted
out only in criminal proceedings, and that "whether proceedings are
criminal or civil is a matter of statutory construction."'
The Court
distinguished a prior opinion as not dealing with the "'humane' interests
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause." 5 After reviewing its prior
precedent, the Court drew the following line: "[I]t follows that a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."52
The Halper Court did not hold that remedial civil sanctions which
"carry the sting of punishment" are therefore criminal.53 Rather, it
stated "merely that in determining whether a particular civil sanction
constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the
sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving
rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated."' Thus in a civil suit in
which the financial sanction bore no rational relation to the government's
losses, the Court held that the civil sanction imposed criminal punishment
for purposes of triggering the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifd Amendment. 55
46. Id. at 446.

47. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
48.
49.
50.
51.

Haper, 490 U.S. at 437.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 447.
Id. (distinguishing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980)).
52. Id. at 448.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 447 n.7.
55. See id. at 450-52; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In Browning-Ferris,the Court returned to the
borderline between civil and criminal law and questioned whether the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to punitive damage awards in state civil actions.
While the opinion answered this question in the negative, its reasoning sheds further light
on the dividing line between civil and criminal actions under the Constitution.
According to the Browning-Ferrisopinion, although punitive damages are clearly

punitive and serve public interests other than that of compensating tort victims, they are
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The Austin court relied heavily upon Halper to reach its result.' If
civil forfeiture now constitutes punishment, and double jeopardy bars a
subsequent prosecution, to paraphrase Edward G. Robinson, Mother of
Mercy, is this the end of Civil Forfeiture?57 To quote another cult

figure, Garth, from Wayne's World, "Not!"58 Litigants will simply focus

their energies on the definition of excessiveness.
The majority opinion in Austin provided no guidance for the lower
courts, giving them a clean slate with which to start. Possible factors the
courts may employ and weigh include the property owner's potential gain

from the offense; other punishments imposed by the trial court upon the
owner, including incarceration and fines; the range of punishment the
owner/offender was subject to for the criminal offense; the risk of harm
to society from the owner/offender's conduct; and, of course, the

traditional nexus test as set forth by Justice Scalia in his Austin
concurrence.5 9 This list is by no means exhaustive. The courts may also

look at the laundry list of factors articulated by the Third Circuit in
analyzing excessiveness under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations statute." Indeed, the final test will undoubtedly be a
combination of factors, such as the test used by the court in 835 Seventh
Street.6' The ultimate test, like those dealing with the innocent owner
and other forfeiture-related defenses and provisions, will be bantered about

until the Supreme Court makes a final determination.

pursued by private parties, not government entities. Id. at 275. Of course, punitive
damage awards are enforced by the states. But, according to the Supreme Court: "Here
the government of Vermont has not taken positive steps to punish, as it most obviously
does in the criminal context, nor has it used the civil courts to extract large payments or
forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or disabling some individual." Id.
The Browning-FerrisCourt went on to distinguish the Haloer case as one involving
the government's effort to exact punishment in a civil action, whereas the plaintiff in
Browning-Ferriswas a private party who would obtain the punitive award. Id. at 275
n.21.
56. See United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1994)
(referring to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2813-15).
57. LIrr= CAESAR (First NationallWarner Bros. 1930) (the original quote is,
"Mother of Mercy, is this the end of Rico?" Apparently, Robinson was referring to
another character, not the federal racketeering statute.).
58. WAYNE'S WORLD (Paramount 1992).

59. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. See United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993).
61. 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying
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There also may be a noticeable rise in criminal forfeiture
prosecutions, such as those under 21 U.S.C. § 853 and 18 U.S.C. § 982,
such that the government will bypass these headaches altogether.
Another interesting result of Austin and its progeny may be its effect
upon double jeopardy cases.'
B. Issues Left Open by Austin
After Austin, the question remained open whether forfeiture of
proceeds can be excessive and constitute punishment. Recall that Austin
dealt with forfeiture of conveyances' and real property" not with the
forfeiture of currency.'
If the courts extend the Austin analysis to
62. For an extensive discussion of double jeopardy and its relation to civil
forfeiture, see KESSLER, supranote 1, § 8.02[8]; see also Ellen Silverman Zimiles, Do
Halper and Austin Put Civil Forfeiture in Double Jeopardy?, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
189 (1994).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). The statute states, in part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession of [controlled substances] ....
Id.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). The statute states:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
The statute states:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for
a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds
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currency, they will have the added problem of deciding what action to
take after a determination of excessiveness or disproportionality. Will the
amount of the forfeiture be reduced? Should all the money be returned?
What if property must be sold to divide the booty proportionately? Who
bears the loss or the burden? Does the claimant lose the property in a
sale, for example, and then get the remaining, excessive amount back?
Should the court ask the jury for a type of special verdict, determining the
percentage of the money that is tainted? These are just a handful of issues
that remain unanswered and ripe for litigation after Austin.
Also open to attack is the constitutionality of the burdens of proof
under the civil forfeiture statutes. If civil forfeiture is now punitive, the
burdens should be similar to those in criminal cases, with the onus on the
government to prove the "guilt" by the highest standard rather than on the
claimants to prove their innocence.
Query, too, whether the courts will stretch the Austin analysis to
punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in civil cases and are,
by definition, punitive. Will their application now be governed by the
Excessive Fines Clause? If so, will that be the link the courts need to
limit the exorbitant tort damage awards which have excited displeasure in
both the lay and legal communities? One difficulty may be that in tort
cases and others involving punitive damage awards, the parties usually do
not include the government or stem from a unilateral governmental taking.
Thus, in those cases there is no governmental activity, such as taking
without compensation, on which the Eighth Amendment can attach. Be
sure that more about this will be discussed in the months ahead.
C. The Lower Courts Deal with Austin
The courts have begun focusing on several of these issues and a trend
is visible. One court that has addressed the issue of whether Austin
applies to prosecutions pursuant to § 881(a)(6) has resolved it in the
negative.' The court rationalized that, "[i]f an item is a proceed of an
illegal drug transaction, its forfeiture is exclusively remedial, as it cannot
be considered punishment to take away something the claimant never
traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the consent of that owner.

Id.
66. See United States v. $288,930, 838 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. IMI.1993); United
States v. West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. III. 1993).
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legitimately owned." 7 The court also distinguished proceeds forfeiture
from forfeitures pursuant to § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), those involved in
Austin, as follows:
The forfeiture of legitimately owned property in Austin was a
punishment because the claimant was deprived of the rights that
the claimant had in the property. In this case, the forfeiture of
allegedly illegally obtained property is not a punishment because
a claimant does not rightfully own the forfeited property.'

In United States v. Tilley,6 the Fifth Circuit ruled that a prior civil
forfeiture of "proceeds" was not punishment under Halper and,
consequently, did not preclude a subsequent prosecution based upon the
same underlying offense.'

Tilley involved the forfeiture of proceeds of

drug trafficking pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 7" Although the Fifth

Circuit held that the forfeiture ofproceeds was entirely remedial and thus

not punishment, the court observed that if the prior proceeding had
involved punishment, double jeopardy would have applied and would have
barred the pending criminal trial.' The court clearly implied that it
would have found the criminal action barred by double jeopardy if the

forfeiture had not involved proceeds.'
"We should make clear,
however, that the sanction in Halper did not involve the proceeds from the
crimes charged and the fact that the property forfeited in today's case
constitutes unlawful proceeds is crucial to our analysis." 4 Two Illinois
67. West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp. at 383. But see United States v. Pole
No. 3172, 852 F.2d 636, 640 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting government's argument that the
entire property was forfeitable because some of the mortgage payments were made with
drug money and holding only the proportion of the property equal to the percentage of
the principal paid on the mortgage could be forfeited by the government).
68. $288,930, 838 F. Supp. at 370.
69. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 299-300.
71. Id. at 297.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 298-99.
74. Id. at 298; see also State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613, 619 (Wash. 1994) (finding
the real property forfeitures involved constituted "punishment" for purposes of federal
double jeopardy analysis, the court stated that it was not deciding whether "forfeiture of
property acquired through proceeds traceable to a criminal violation to be 'punishment'
under the Fifth Amendment").
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district court casese7 and a Missouri appellate court 6 reached similar

conclusions.

But the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. $405,089.23, rejected the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Tilley. 7 The court found that Austin
explicitly refused to apply Tilley's "case-by-case" approach.7 8 Instead,
the Austin court adopted a "categorical approach to 'punishment'
determinations in the forfeiture context," requiring a reviewing court to
look "to the entire scope of the statute which the government seeks to
employ, rather than to the characteristics of the specific property the
government seeks to forfeit."7 9 Because the Austin Court did not
distinguish between drug proceeds and non-drug proceeds, the Ninth
Circuit found, any determination of whether forfeiture constitutes
punishment must look to the broader punitive purposes of the forfeiture
statute as a whole.'
In concluding that forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) constitute punishment,
the $405,089.23 court noted that the Austin Court relied upon three facts
in determining that forfeitures under § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) were
punishment: (1) the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment,
(2) the clear focus of § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on the culpability of the owner
(both provide a defense for innocent owners) and (3) the evidence that
Congress understood those provisions as serving to deter and punish. 8
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, as these three factors apply equally to
forfeitures under § 881(a)(6), Austin requires courts to view forfeitures
under § 881(a)(6) as punishment.' z
75. United States v. $45,140, 839 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that,
if money constitutes the proceeds of a drug transaction, it is illegal to possess and its
forfeiture is not punishment; but if the money is merely used to facilitate a drug
purchase, it is not illegal to possess and its forfeiture is at least partly punitive); United
States v. $288,930, 838 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. Il. 1993) (holding that forfeiture of
allegedly illegally obtained property, such as the proceeds from drug sales under §
881(a)(6), is not punishment because the claimant does not rightfully own the forfeited
property).
76. State v. Meister, 866 S.W.2d 485, 490-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
a person who received money in exchange for contraband drugs has no constitutionally
protected property interest in the proceeds superior to the state's statutory interest).
77. 33 F.3d 1210, 1220 (9th Cir. 1994).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 1220-21.
82. Id. at 1221.
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Following $405,089.23, an Illinois district court, in United States v.
4204 Thorndale Avenue, 3 again confronted the issue and accepted the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning that forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) are not solely
remedial, because "forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) are not limited to the
proceeds of illegal activity."'
Interestingly, however, the 4204
ThorndaleAvenue court, although finding the Eighth Amendment analysis
applicable, held that the claimant failed to meet the Seventh Circuit's
standard of showing a "gross proportionality between the penalties and the
offenses committed to establish a constitutional violation."' Therefore,
the applicable forfeiture did not constitute punishment in violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause.'
At least one limitation has been imposed on the scope of Austin. In
McNichols v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' the court held that
Austin did not apply to a civil income tax case.88 It stated that neither
Austin's holding nor its statements that a forfeiture can be excessive under
the Eighth Amendment "are or should be applicable to any actions other
than forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)."19
The district courts are split regarding whether the Austin analysis
applies to proceedings under the False Claims Act.' In United States v.
Education Department Network,91 the court said no, finding that since the
award sought by the government under the Act is remedial, it could not
be "excessive" under Austin.92 This holding is ironic, in light of the fact
that the Act was the subject of the Supreme Court's decision in Halper.1
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co.,' the court
found Austin applicable to a qui tam action brought pursuant to the Act.95
83. No. 92 C 3744, 1994 WL 687628 (N.D. 111. Dec. 7, 1994).

84. Id. at *10.
85. Id. (citing United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721,728 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Vriner, 921 F.2d 710, 712-713 (7th Cir. 1991)).
86. id. at *11.
87. 13 F.3d 432 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2705 (1994).
88. Id. at 434.
89. Id. The court also distinguished the facts of its case, in which the appellant had
signed a plea agreement agreeing to the forfeiture, with those of Austin, and found no
Eighth Amendment violation.
90. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
91. No. 89-7780, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18013 (E.D. Pa. Dee. 20, 1993).
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *17.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
840 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
Id. at 74.
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Looking to the facts of the case, that is, the low level of actual damages,

less than $2000, in relation to the more than $290,000 sought by the
government, the court held that the damages sought constituted

"punishment" under Halper,9 Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont v.

Kelco Disposal,' and Austin. It was therefore appropriate for the court
to consider the excessiveness of the punishment. 9"
It appears that the courts applied Austin to cases that were not yet
final when Austin was decided.'

D. The Lower Courts Tackle Excessiveness and Disproportionality
So what will the Austin test shape up to be? Between the language in
Justice Scalia's opinion and theories adopted under other analyses, the

district and circuit courts have begun taking a stab at the challenge. In an
attempt to provide "guidance" to the lower court, the Third Circuit

suggested first that, whatever the analysis, it should be different from that
applied to monetary fines."
One factor which the court said may be
appropriate when making the excessiveness determination is whether the
relationship of the property to the offense was "close enough to render the
property, under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable.""'
Formulating the test, however, has been difficult for the lower courts.

Their tests have run the gamut.
instructive." °

A review of the decisions is

The first cases to apply Austin used Justice Scalia's nexus test as a
starting point and found the forfeiture appropriate under the facts. In both
96. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
97. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
98. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. at 74.
99. See, e.g., United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 873 n.9 (3d Cir.
1994) (citing United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1993)).
100. R.R. #1, Box 244, 14 F.3d at 873.
101. Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
102. Additionally, on January 7, 1994, the Justice Department issued a 63-page
memorandum, ostensibly to "provide guidance and uniformity in responding to
excessiveness challenges" stemming from Austin and Alexander v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2766 (1993).
See KESSLER, supra note 1, at App. E4-2 (reprinting the
memorandum). Although the memorandum takes a "hard line" approach to defenses
based on Austin and Alexander, that description is clearly an understatement. Id. §
8.02[5]. The Department of Justice actually advises that "only in the rarest and most
extreme cases" should forfeitures be held to violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at
App. E4-58.
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In Re King Properties" and United States v. 2828 North 54th Street"
the property owners had used their homes as the bases of substantial drug
operations. Large amounts of drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in

both homes.") Under these facts, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
and the United States District Court in Wisconsin had little trouble
concluding that forfeiture of the properties was appropriate.'0 6 The

same analysis was followed in United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights,"1°
where the court also limited its inquiry to the relationship between the
defendant property and the offense.108

But in what always must be a fact intensive analysis, the courts have
started to use other factors or combinations of factors to determine the
excessiveness of a particular forfeiture. In United States v. 427 & 429

Hall Street,"° the court articulated a two-step balancing test for
determining whether a forfeiture pursuant to §881(a)(4) and (a)(7) violates
the Excessive Fines Clause.1 ' The test incorporated both Justice
Scalia's "instrumentality" test as well as a proportionality test."'

According to the court, the government must first show a "substantial
connection" between the defendant property and the drug trafficking in
question."' If it does, the burden shifts to the claimant to show that the
forfeiture of the subject property is a "grossly disproportionate"
punishment, given the nature of the drug trafficking involved. 13 Factors
courts should use in their determinations include the amount of drugs

involved, their value, the trafficking's timespan, and the effect of the
103.
104.
105.
106.

635 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1993).
829 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
2828 N. 54th St., 829 F. Supp. at 1073; King Properties,829 A.2d at 129.
2828 N. 54th St., 829 F. Supp. at 1073; King Properties,829 A.2d at 133.
107. 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994).
108. Id. at 330-31.
109. 853 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
110. Id. at 1398.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1399.
113. Id. It is interesting to note that the same judge who wrote the decision in 427
& 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389, had, only months earlier, used only the
instrumentality test as the sole factor in deciding the issue of excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1429
(M.D. Ala. 1994).
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distribution on individuals and on the community.
The claimant's
culpability, however, is irrelevant to the excessive fine analysis." 5
A similar test was adopted in United States v,. 13143 S.W. 15th
Lane."' The court, citing 427 & 429 Hall Street, used the two-pronged
test to decide the issue of excessiveness."1 However, contrary to 427
& 429 Hall Street, the court, in a footnote, expressly stated that it "does
not mean to foreclose other factors from being considered in an Excessive
Fines analysis." 1 The court recognized that other cases "may present
factual circumstances which require either a deviation from or additions
to" the two-pronged test. 9 This is important, emphasizing the factspecific nature of an excessiveness analysis and that the court, despite
"precedent" to the contrary, did not mean to limit the trier of fact in its
review. A broader analysis, including other factors, was not, therefore,
precluded by the Florida court.
In State v. 392 South 600 East,"° the Utah Supreme Court
sidestepped enunciating a test for determining excessiveness. However,
the court did acknowledge that the proper test involves an analysis of more
than just instrumentality,121 although the analysis must begin with a
"basic 'substantial connection' or 'instrumentality' analysis.""m Because
the court found the government's proof failed to meet the substantial
connection test, it declined to further define the appropriate Excessive
Fines Clause analysis." 5 However, the court emphasized that the
instrumentality test "is the beginning point, rather than the sole
criterion." 1" Like the 13143 S.W. 15th Lane court, the court left open
"what other factors . . . may be comprehended by an excessive fines
analysis. "12
114.
115.
116.
117.

427 & 429 HaU St., 853 F. Supp. at 1400.

Id.
872 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Id. at 973.

118. Id. at 973 n.8.
119. Id.

120. 886 P.2d 534 (Utah 1994).
121. Id. at 541 (holding that "the connection between the property and the offense
is not the sole criterion for determining whether a given forfeiture is constitutionally

excessive").
122. Id.
123. Id. at 452.

124. ld.
125. Id.
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Proportionality is becoming a more prominent part of the test. The
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. 18755 North Bay Road,"6 held
that forfeiture of an elderly couple's $150,000 home, after a conviction for
holding illegal weekly poker games there, would impose a disproportionate
penalty given the relatively small scale of the gambling operation and,
therefore, violated the Excessive Fines Clause." z

In United States v. 1988 White Jeep Cherokee," the district court
noted that "the principle of proportionality still survives."" 9 The court
reiterated the conclusions reached by the Third Circuit in United States v.
Sarbello: '
"We note that a district court's proportionality analysis, while
it will not in every case be extensive or encompass the three
factors set forth in Solem, must necessarily accommodate the facts
of the case and weigh the seriousness of the offense, including the
moral gravity of the crime measured in terms of the magnitude

and nature of its harmful reach, against the severity of the
criminal sanction. Other helpful inquiries might include an
assessment of the personal benefit reaped by the defendant, the

defendant's motive and culpability, and, of course, the extent that
the defendant's interest and the enterprise itself are tainted by
criminal conduct. . . . The language of the eighth amendment

demands that a constitutionally cognizable disproportionality reach
such a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is
more criminal than the crime."'3

126. 13 F.3d 1493 (l1th Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 1498.
128. No. 1993-132, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6813 (D.V.I. Apr. 25, 1994).
129. Id. at *10.
130. 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993).
131. 1988 White Jeep Cherokee, No. 1993-132, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6813 at
*11-12 (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) and
referring to Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)) (involving an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a RICO forfeiture, in which the Court held that "the eighth amendment
requires that a criminal RICO forfeiture order be justly proportioned to the charged
offense," and elaborated that "some proportionality analysis is required upon the
defendant's prima facie showing that the [forfeiture] is grossly disproportionate, or bears
no close relation, to the seriousness of the crime").
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The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit has expressed the view that
proportionality remains relevant to determining whether a forfeiture
violates the Eighth Amendment. 132

The district court in United States v. 429 South Main Street, 33 also

used proportionality as part of its test relating to the question of

excessiveness." 3 The Ohio court found that the forfeiture of a residence
valued at more than $83,000 was not excessive despite the fact that the

underlying criminal activity consisted of three sales of marijuana for a
total of ninety-five dollars. 35

It was persuaded by the fact that the

owner whose criminal acts led to the forfeiture could have been
imprisoned for ten years and fined $500,000 on each count."

A federal court in Michigan that recently analyzed a forfeiture action
applied both Justice Scalia's 'instrumentality' test and the 'proportionality'

test in analyzing the forfeiture before it.

7

The most comprehensive analysis to date of the excessiveness issue

may be found in United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive.13 1 There, in a
case applying an Eighth Amendment analysis to an action brought pursuant
to the civil forfeiture provision of the federal money laundering
statute,1 39 the court weighed three factors, none of which was
dispositive, to determine the excessiveness of the forfeiture: (1) the
inherent gravity of the offense compared with the harshness of the penalty,

(2) whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the
132. Id. at *12 (stating that "'an inquiry into the proportionality between the value
of the instrumentality sought to be forfeited and the amount needed to effectuate the
legitimate remedial purposes of the forfeiture would seem to be in order'" and that "'the
proportional relationship of the value of proceeds to the harm occasioned by a
defendant's criminal conduct may, in a given case, be relevant under the Supreme
Court's approach in Austin'") (quoting United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219,221 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
133. 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
134. Id. at 341.
135. Id. at 342.
136. Id.
137. United States v. 11869 Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. 107, 110-11 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding that the forfeiture of a residence valued at $85,000 residence was
not a disproportionate penalty, given the street value of drugs tied to property on which
house was located and applicable federal criminal fine of up to $250,000); see also State
v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613, 619 (Wash. 1994) (en bane) (stating that the difference between
the equity in the claimant's property-$30,921--and the government's cost of prosecution
and investigation-$26,000--constituted "rough remedial justice" and, therefore, was not
an excessive fine).
138. 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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crime and (3) whether the criminal activity involving the subject property
was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use." This test appears
to be a strong, objective test. Note, too, that at least one element deals
with the gravity of the offense and its relation to the forfeiture
penalty.141 The court also stated the obvious: that even though forfeiture
can apply where the claimant is acquitted of the criminal charges, "the
actions of a claimant adjudged innocent are necessarily less serious than
those of a claimant who has been found guilty."142 The Zumirez analysis
is extensive and thorough and should be reviewed by every practitioner
researching the issue of excessiveness.
Interestingly, the 427 & 429 Hall Street court called the Zumirez test
too subjective for its taste because it gave paramount importance to "the
personal, subjective feelings of the individual judge as to simply 'what
seems right' on a case by case basis, rather than giving objective guidance
to the court in an effort to achieve consistent application of the law." 1"3
The court added
that the test also may place too heavy a burden on the
14
government. 4
Subsequent decisions fail to confirm that view. Thus far, at least five
courts have adopted the Zumirez approach, resulting in split decisions.
Two other courts have adopted a modified Zumirez analysis.
In United States v. Rural Route 1, Mound Road,"'the court found

Justice Scalia's "suggestion" to be "one relevant factor" in testing
excessiveness and adopted it as the second of the multi-factor test
fashioned in Zumirez. 1' In holding that the forfeiture was not excessive
where the claimants' equity in the subject property was only approximately
$25,000 more than the value of the narcotics involved,14 the court
emphasized that the nature of an excessive fines inquiry is fact
intensive.' "[A]t this stage," and given the facts before it, the court
denied claimants' motion to dismiss on excessiveness grounds.

49

140. 6625 Zwnirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 732.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 736.
143. United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (M.D. Ala.
1994).

144. See id.
145. No. 90-C-4722, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6433 (E.D. 111. May 12, 1994).
146. Id. at *6.

147. Id. at *8.
148. Id. at *5.
149. Id. at *11.
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In United States v. 24124 Lemay Street,1" the court found that the
three-factor inquiry in Zumirez was "the most appropriate test for
determining whether the forfeiture in the present case violates the Eighth
Amendment.""' The court noted that the test applies the relevant
factors necessary for making an excessiveness determination under the
Eighth Amendment and, as such, gives "'renewed significance to the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause and will have the added
benefit of checking the government's potential for abusive use of the civil
forfeiture statutes.'"152 Under the facts before it, the court held that
forfeiture of claimant's home was not excessive under the Eighth
Amendment.'153
Another federal judge in California followed the lead of Zumirez,
finding that "application of the factors established in 6625 Zumirez well
serves the requirement for Eighth Amendment scrutiny established in

Austin. "154
The Illinois Court of Appeals used what is best described as a
modified Zumirez test in analyzing the excessiveness issue. In People ex
rel. Waller v. 1992 Oldsmobile Station Wagon, 55 the court found it
"inevitable" that some consideration of the extent to which the forfeited
property facilitated the offense would "be relevant to the determination of
A related concern raised by the court was the
excessiveness.""5
number of occasions the property has been used in connection with illegal
activities. 5 7 "We share the concern of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that 'any property, whether it be a hobo's
hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the government
because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal record, engages
in a single drug transaction."'15
That court also included in its analysis the degree of the property
owner's culpability, the value of the property, and the relative seriousness
of the offense:
150. 857 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
151. Id. at 1382.
152. Id. (quoting United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 735
(C.D. Cal. 1994)).
153. 24124 Lemay St., 857 F. Supp. at 1383.
154. United States v. 3636 Roselawn Ave., No. CV 92-2034, 1994 WL 524985, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1994).
155. 638 N.E.2d 373 (IlM.App. Ct. 1994).
156. Id. at 376.
157. See id.
158. Id. (quoting United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)).
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"Excessive" is defined as "exceeding the usual, proper or normal.
* * * EXCESSIVE implies an amount or degree too great to be
reasonable or acceptable." ... By definition, a determination of
"excessive" punishment includes a consideration of the amount of
punishment in relation to the seriousness of the offense: the
punishment should fit the crime. We do not mean to imply that
a precise mathematical ratio can be established between the
seriousness of the owner's involvement in the crime and the value
of the property. Rather, each case must be considered on its own
facts.'
The court remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of the
issues in light of its decision."
In United States v. 2408 Parliament,"' the court also used a threepronged inquiry, but not the one utilized in Zumirez. Here the court's
first two prongs relate to factual determinations, while the third requires
balancing factual determinations with equitable considerations. 1" The
court must first determine how extensive the use of the property in the
underlying crime was and the value of the property. 16 Then, given
these determinations, the court must decide whether the forfeiture is an
excessive penalty. 1" In answering these questions, the court noted that
it should look to the totality of the circumstances in the case before it. No
one fact or determination should end the inquiry." In the case at bar,
the court held that forfeiture of an $87,000 piece of property was not
unconstitutionally excessive in light of the defendant's use of the property
to grow more than 400 marijuana plants, the high street value of the
marijuana generated from the plants, and the maximum fine of $2 million
applicable to growing more than 100 marijuana plants. 1 6
In Thorp v. State, 67 the Georgia Supreme Court, in an exceptionally
thoughtful opinion, adopted the Zumirez test. The court found that an
evaluation of the three general factors enunciated in Zumirez "well serves
the scrutiny demanded by the Excessive Fines Clause" and serves as
159. Id. (quoting WEBSTEm'S NINTH NEw COLLEOIATE DICrIONARY 432 (1990)).
160. See id. at 377.

161.
162.
163.
164.

859 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
Id. at 1077-78.
Id. at 1078.
Id.

165. Id.

166. Id.
167. 450 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 1994).
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"minimal guidelines for excessiveness inquiries in the State."" s The
court had no difficulty finding that a proportionality analysis "is
necessary" to determine whether an in rem forfeiture is excessive."
Finally, in an eloquent analysis of the issues, U.S. District Judge
William M. Acker of the Northern District of Alabama cited Zumirez
favorably in concluding that a claimant's home should be given greater
protection in any excessive fines analysis: "Obviously, the harshness of
taking the roof from over the head of a person, even a wrongdoer, is
something that must be carefully examined if the Eighth Amendment is to
be given meaning, as it was unanimously in Austin, even over the strong
resistance of the United States.170
Judge Acker's opinion in United States v. 461 Shelby County Road
361 is filled with wonderful thoughts and wanderings as the court ferreted
its way through various aspects of forfeiture. For example, the court
examined the government's approach to post-Austin cases:
In both Austin and Alexander, the United States strenuously
argued to the Supreme Court that the Eighth Amendment has no
application to forfeiture proceedings, which are in rem. The
reaction of all nine justices to this argument amounted to a
stunning rejection of the United States' position, after which the
United States has retreated to the position that "only in the rarest
and most extreme cases" should forfeiture be held to violate the
Excessive Fines Clause and therefore that proposed forfeitures
should be upheld unless they "would shock the conscience."
Whether the United States would have a jury decide whether its
collective conscience is shocked, or whether the court's
conscience should be the conscience to be or not to be shocked,
remains a matter of speculation. The generic brief filed by the
United States seems designed to justify 90% of all forfeitures.
Because the instant case is a civil case, Alexander is only of
secondary or collateral interest. Yet, the United States argues
broadly in an attempt to build a dam to staunch the flood of
resistance171to forfeitures in both the criminal and the civil
contexts.

168. Id. at 420.
169. Id. at 418-19.
170. United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D.
Ala. 1994).
171. Id. at 937.
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The court could not understand an approach, such as that presented
by the government, which sought, at all costs, to avoid "proportionality"
as the controlling criterion for judging the question of excessiveness:1
[The word 'excessive' necessarily implies an analysis based on
an exercise of judicial discretion relating the degree of an
individual owner's criminal culpability to the severity of the
punishment represented by the value of his property to be
divested. This has always been the analysis for applying the
Excessive Fines Clause."
The court, almost rhetorically, cited Third and Eleventh circuit cases,
among others, which had already used proportionality as their controlling
factor in examining excessiveness. 74 It found that the ability of the
offender to pay must be a factor in any excessiveness analysis:
Simply put, courts cannot order a culprit to pay more money in
fines or restitution than he can reasonably be expected to pay, no
matter how heinous his crime. This principle rarely comes into
play in forfeiture cases because the mere fact that the wrongdoer
owns the property to be forfeited proves his ability to turn it over,
no matter what it is worth. But, this principle does dominate the
excessiveness inquiry if the property to be forfeited is the
offender's homestead, property historically given a high degree
of protection. It is much more likely that the taking of the
homeplace would constitute an excessive fine than the taking of
other property of equal value. Society already has more homeless
people than it wants or can take care of, and this court is wary of
adding the [claimants] to the list of the homeless. It makes this
court wince to think of the [claimants], who have regularly made
their home mortgage payments, being forced into the street while
their mortgage
payments enure to the benefit of the United
1 75
States.
The court also used as its statement of facts a report, drafted by the
U.S. Probation Service at the request of the court, which had concluded
that the claimants had been sufficiently punished in the criminal
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 937-38 (citing United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 97476 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.
1994)).
175. Id. at 938.
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proceedings. 6 Adopting the report, the court held that the forfeiture
of claimants' home based upon the sale of marijuana on five occasions and
cocaine on two occasions to an undercover agent at their home was
"shocking" to its conscience." The court stated:
This court does not mean to condone what [the claimants] did, but
the fact that drug trafficking cannot be condoned does not lead
inexorably to the taking away of the only residence of two small
drug traffickers long after those traffickers have paid their debts
to society and have cooperated fully with law enforcement.'
Calling the government's actions "unfair" and "excessive," the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the property.179
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Waller v. 1989
Ford F350 Truck,' adopted a multifactor proportionality test. Finding
that a test that turns exclusively on the relationship between the forfeited
property and the offense is "patently inadequate and necessarily conflates
the eighth amendment excessive fine analysis with the determination of
whether the property is subject to forfeiture in the first instance," the
court held that the Zumirez test was fine but that it was too restrictive.181
It held that the trial court should not be precluded from considering factors
not specifically listed in the three-prong Zumirez test."s
Austin's footnote fifteen, however, did not deter the Fourth Circuit
from focusing its test for weighing forfeitures under the Eighth
Amendment upon the instrumentality. In United States v. Chandler,"3
the Fourth Circuit held that the only relevant inquiry in determining
excessiveness is the closeness of the relationship between the property and
the offense.18" The court adopted a three-part instrumentality test that
considers "(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the
extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability of
the owner and (3) the possibility of separating offending property that can
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 940.

Id.
Id.

Id.

180. 642 N.E.2d 460 (M. 1994).
181. Id. at 466.
182. Id.
183. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
184. Id. at 364 ("The question of excessiveness is thus tied to the 'guilt of the
property' of the extent to which the property was involved in the offense, and not its
value.").
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readily be separated from the remainder.""
The court said: "In
measuring the strength and extent of the nexus between the property and
the offense, a court may take into account the following [five] factors,"
none of which is dispositive, but which, under the totality of the
circumstances, would enable the court to conclude that "the property was
a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the
offense, or would have been, had the offensive conduct been carried out
as intended."" These factors are:
(1) whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate
and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous; (2) whether the
property was important to the success of the illegal activity; (3)
the time during which the property was illegally used and the
spacial extent of its use; (4) whether its illegal use was an isolated
event or had been repeated; and (5) whether the purpose of
acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to carry out the
offense."
The Chandler court limited its application to the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment and not to the Excessive
Fines Clause, the subject of Austin. Thus, the court found: "While the
principle of proportionality is traditionally associated with discussions of
whether punishment is cruel and unusual . . .we believe that it is not
applicable when considering the excessiveness of a forfeiture of
specifically identified property."18 Consequently, the court approved
the forfeiture of a thirty-three-acre tract of land where the farm house was
used to sell narcotics, the land helped shield the farm house and
transactions from public view, and the property owner was intimately
involved in the extensive drug activity."8 9
Remarkably, though, the courts which have adopted Justice Scalia's
approach have outright rejected any inclusion of factors such as
proportionality within their analysis. Supporters of the instrumentality
test, too, have been passionate about keeping "morality" outside the
forfeiture picture. 9' It should not be surprising, therefore, that most
support for Scalia's approach has come from the government. Those
185. Id. at 365.
186. Id.

187. Id.
188. Id. at 365-66.
189. Id. at 366.
190. See Cameron H. Holmes, Excessive-Fine Analysis Gels in 4th Cir. Chandler
Opinion, MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Dec. 1994, at 1, 3.
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supporting instrumentality as the sole 'criterion seem to have forgotten to
read the majority opinion in Austin."'
Notably, some courts have refrained altogether from articulating a
test, or have defined a test only to state that it is inconclusive and open for
future modification. 1" This is not what the Supreme Court had in mind.
As virtually all of the courts addressing these issues have agreed,
however, there is no one method of analysis. 1 As illustrated, others
include balancing the crime committed against the nature and value of the
property sought to be forfeited," analyzing the difference between the

value of the instrumentality sought to be forfeited and the amount needed

to "effectuate the legitimate remedial purposes of the forfeiture," 95 and
assessing the personal benefit reaped by the defendant, the defendant's
motive and culpability and the extent that the defendant's interest and the
enterprise itself are tainted by criminal conduct. 1" One court has even
suggested adopting the standard used in Solem v. Helm,"9 a case
decided under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth

191. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812, n.15. The Court stated:
Justice SCALIA suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's
excessivenessis the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense.
• . . We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the
property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way
limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining
whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was excessive.
Id.; see also Thorp v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 1994) (discussing thoroughly the
instrumentality and proportionality prongs of an excessive fines analysis).
192. See, e.g., United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 973
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that the court was not bound to follow the instrumentality test
set out by Justice Scalia in Austin because it is part of a concurring opinion); In re
Forfeiture of One 1993 Dodge Intrepid, 645 So.2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State
v. 392 S. 600 E., 886 P.2d 534 (Utah 1994).
193. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.15 (1993) ("We do not rule
out the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be
relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering
other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of... property was excessive."); see
United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 873 (3d Cir. 1994); United States ex
rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1993); United States
v. $288,930, 838 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
194. See R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d at 873; Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. at 7475; West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp. at 383-84.
195. United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993).
196. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d at 875 (quoting the test used in United States v.
Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993), which analyzed a criminal RICO forfeiture
in light of the Excessive Fines Clause).
197. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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Amendment.'" In Solem, the Supreme Court identified three objective
criteria for use in an Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis: "(i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." 99

Even the Solem Court, however, specifically noted that "no one factor will
be dispositive in a given case."" The Supreme Court said that, in
weighing these factors, a court should take into account the "absolute
magnitude of the crime" and the "culpability of the offender."" 1 At
least two federal courts, however, have held that Solem has been placed
in doubt by Harmelin v. Michigan.'
In United States v. Monroe,' a pre-Austin decision, the court found

that the forfeiture of the defendant's real property, in addition to a tenyear prison sentence, did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation

because the forfeiture and imprisonment were not disproportionate to the
defendant's crimes.'

In coming to its conclusion, the court considered,

among other things, the maximum fine and term of imprisonment the
defendant could have received.'
The bottom line appears to be that the courts are just now feeling their
oats with respect to this issue. It is difficult to conceive a test limited to
the instrumentality prong. At minimum, Austin's footnote fifteen

illustrates the majority's clear refusal to put its imprimatur on Justice
Scalia's test.2 In fact, it appears to disapprove the idea that that test
is the only appropriate criteria for determining if a civil forfeiture is
198. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1987).
199. 463 U.S. at 292.
200. Id. at 290 n.17.
201. Id. at 293. Note that, in the criminal forfeiture context of Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), the Court did not establish a test for excessiveness, but
made a point of emphasizing that the issue of excessiveness should be considered "in the
light of the extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through
[his] racketeering enterprise over a substantial period of time" rather than on the basis
of what the petitioner called "a few materials the jury ultimately decided were obscene."
Id. at 2776; see infra Part II.
202. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 P. Supp. 725, 731 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991)).
203. 866 F.2d 1357 (lth Cir. 1989).
204. Id. at 1367.
205. See id.
206. Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812 n.15 (1993).
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excessive.'
Knowing that the Eighth Circuit would have to apply an
excessiveness test on remand, the majority stated that the Court of Appeals
was not limited to Justice Scalia's test but could consider other factors as
well.=
Further, Justice Scalia's instrumentality test is based on the same legal
fiction-that the property is considered the offender in all in rem forfeiture
cases-questioned by the Austin Court.'
The majority in Austin
recognized that civil in rem forfeitures are not predicated solely on the
notion that the property is guilty. 210 "The Court has understood this
fiction to rest on the notion that the owner who allows his property to
become involved in an offense has been negligent." 211 In fact, the
majority predicated the applicability of the excessiveness 12prohibition on
the ground that the forfeiture served to punish the owner
In addition, as that dreaded common sense dictates, and as some of
the courts discussed above have found, the very word "excessive" plainly
contemplates some comparison of the fine to the conduct sought to be
punished to determine if the fine violates the Eighth Amendment. In this
regard, one commentator said that "it is difficult to imagine... how a
fine could ever be found 'excessive' without some analysis of the
relationship21 3 between the penalty and the offense for which it is
imposed."
Indeed, Justice White, in the context of a dissent in a
cruel and unusual punishment case, indicated his view that the word
"excessive" implies a proportionality requirement and that such a
requirement for the Eighth Amendment might indeed stem from the
Excessive
Fines Clause and not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
214
Clause.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 2812.
209. Id. at 2813-14 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
210. See id. at 2808-10.
211. Id. at 2809.
212. Id. at 2807-10; see also The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 144, 205-14 (1993).
213. Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damagesandthe Eighth Amendment: An
Analytical Frameworkfor Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1433, 1450
(1987) (citing United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987)).
214. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
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Also, although Alexander v. United States involved a criminal in

personam forfeiture, it supports the conclusion that the word "excessive"

connotes a proportionality review.215
Finally, as one court put it, there is more reason to apply a
proportionality analysis in forfeiture cases than in punishment cases
because in the former the government stands to benefit from the revenue
raised whereas in the latter the government must bear the expense of the
imprisonment.216
The Third Circuit sounded a smart note of caution, when it said that,
in this complex web of burdens of proof and other requirements, the
district courts should "avoid conflating the Eighth Amendment inquiry
with § 881(a)(7)'s nexus requirement, although the two share some
characteristics." 217 It is enough that there is confusion regarding the
standard of probable cause.
The Austin analysis should not be
compounded with it.
E. Who Should Decide What Is Excessive?

The Third Circuit has addressed the issue of who decides what is

excessive. In United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, the Third Circuit
suggested that considering the present uncertainty of the law and the

215. In Alexander, discussed infra Part 11, the defendant argued that "the forfeiture
. -considered atop his 6-year prison term and his $100,000 fne-[was]
disproportionate to the gravity of his offenses and therefore violate[d] the Eighth
Amendment, either as a 'cruel and unusual punishment' or an 'excessive fine.'"
Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993). The Eighth Circuit had ruled that a
proportionality review of the forfeiture did not have to be conducted because a
proportionality review was not necessary for a "sentence less than life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole." Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825, 836 (8th
Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court ruled that that statement only was relevant to the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments but not the prohibition
against excessive fines. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775. It further stated that "it is in
light of the extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted.., over
a substantial period of time that the question of whether or not the forfeiture was
'excessive' must be considered." Id. at 2776. The Court remanded the case to the
circuit court to consider Alexander's argument. If proportionality was not required by
the Excessive Fines Clause, then the proper disposition of the case would have been to
affirm the circuit court as to Alexander's proportionality contention. Moreover, the
Court's statement that the proper inquiry had to focus on the extent of Alexander's
criminal activities indicates that a proportionality review was appropriate.
216. Thorp v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416, 419 (Ga. 1994); cf Harnelin, 111 S. Ct. at
2693 n.9.
217. United States v. R.R. #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 873 (3d Cir. 1994).
218. Id. at 864.
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interest of judicial efficiency, the courts should "consider submitting the
question to a jury on a special interrogatory and then alternately treating
the answer
as non-binding and decide the excessiveness question
itself." 219 An interesting mix. The court quoted the Seventh Circuit,
which found that "'the infusion of the earthy common sense of a jury
might upon occasion mitigate appropriately the harsh impact sometimes
characteristic of in rem procedure.'"'
For a claimant's peers to decide
the issues of proportionality and excessiveness, at least at the outset,
seems to be the logical and proper choice.

II. ALEXANDER V. UNITD STATES
The First and Eighth amendments were the subject of a second
Supreme Court opinion issued on the final day of the 1992-93 term. In
Alexander v. United States," the petitioner, owner of numerous
businesses dealing in sexually explicit materials, was convicted of, among
other things, violating federal obscenity laws and RICO.'
The
obscenity convictions, based upon a finding that seven items sold at
several stores were obscene, were the predicates for his RICO
convictions.'
In addition to imposing a six-year prison term and a
$100,000 fine, the district court ordered petitioner, as punishment for the
RICO violations, to forfeit his businesses and almost $9 million allegedly
acquired through racketeering activity.'
In affirming the forfeiture
order, the Eighth Circuit rejected petitioner's arguments that RICO's
forfeiture provisions constituted a prior restraint on speech and were
overbroad.'
"'The mere assertion of some possible self-censorship
resulting from a statute is not enough to render an anti-obscenity law
unconstitutional under our precedents.'" ' The court also held that the
forfeiture did not violate the Eighth Amendment, concluding that
proportionality review is not required of any sentence less than life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.'
Although several
219. Id.at 876.
220. Id.(quoting United States v. 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 469

(7th Cir. 1980)).
221. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
222. Id. at 2769.

223. Id.
224.
225.
226.
(1989)).
227.

Id. at 2769-70.
Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 835 (quoting Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 486 U.S. 46, 60
Id. at 836.
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courts previously had raised the Eighth Amendment as a possible
prohibition to a RICO forfeiture where the scope of the forfeiture would
be "grossly disproportionate" to the criminal misconduct involving the
enterprise's assets," the Eighth Circuit did not consider whether the
forfeiture was disproportionate or "excessive.'
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the five-justice

majority held that the government did not violate the defendant's First
Amendment rights to free speech when its agents seized virtually all of the

defendant's assets.'3

The Court rationalized that no rights were violated

because the seizure was related to previous RICO violations.

31

As to the Eighth Amendment argument, however, the Court was
unanimous.? It found that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause "'limits the Government's power to extract payments as

punishment for an offense.'"' The Court held that the in personam
criminal forfeiture at issue under RICO was clearly a form of monetary
punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a
traditional "fine."2 14
In analyzing the Eighth Amendment issues, the Court found an
important distinction between the respective clauses of the amendment.
The Court stated that, unlike the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause-which is concerned with matters such as the duration or

conditions of confinement-"the Excessive Fines Clause limits the
Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as
228. See United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d
846, 857-58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Regan, 726
F. Supp. 447, 457-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
229. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 835-36.
230. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2770-75.
231. Id. at 2772-73.
232. The dissenters vigorously opposed the majority's First Amendment analysis.
See id. at 2776-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, they had no objection to
remanding the case for further consideration under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2786
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued, however, that it was unnecessary to
reach the Eighth Amendment issue in light of their opinion that the government action
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 2775 (quoting Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2805-06
(1993)).
234. Id. at 2775-76.
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punishment for some offense." 35
RICO's in personam crminal
forfeiture "is clearly a form of monetary punishment no different, for
Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional 'fine. ' "'
Accordingly,
the Court held, the forfeiture aspects under RICO should be analyzed

under the Excessive Fines Clause. 37 It stated that it was "preferable"
that the question of excessiveness be addressed by the lower court in the

first instance. z38 Interestingly, the Court made a point of emphasizing
that the issue of excessiveness should be considered "in the light of the
extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through
[his] racketeering enterprise over a substantial period of time" rather than
on the basis of what the petitioner called "a few materials the jury
ultimately decided were obscene." 9 Given the way the Court framed

the issue for review by the Court of Appeals, it appears unlikely that the
instant forfeiture would be found to be constitutionally "excessive."
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the threat of
disproportionate and unconscionable consequences is not just to what the

majority considered "smut" peddlers.'

°

"Any bookstore or press

enterprise could be forfeited as punishment for even a single obscenity

conviction.""' Thus, taking the new ruling to its logical conclusion, if
a store sold something deemed "offensive" by local authorities, the

government could legally confiscate the entire business.
Alexander raises concerns because the Court appears to be permitting

consideration of uncharged acts and crimes the defendant has not been
convicted of in the determination of excessiveness.

What makes the

Court's analysis even more disturbing is that Alexander involved an action
brought under RICO's in personam criminal forfeiture provisions. The
235. Id. at 2755 (quoting Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted)); accordBrowning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 n.6 (1989) ("At the time of the drafting and ratification of the
[Eighth] Amendment, the word 'fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign
as punishment for some offense").
236. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775; accord Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801. Unlike 21
U.S.C. § 881, the civil in rem statute at issue in Austin, RICO forfeiture is criminal and
inpersonam. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Accordingly, there was
no question as to the applicability of the Eighth Amendment. In the criminal forfeiture
context, it has long been held that forfeitures, like other fines and penalties, are punitive
in nature, thereby falling within the reach and scope of the Eighth Amendment. See
KESSLER, supranote 1, § 1.03.
237. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2776.
238. Id.
239. ld.
240. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
241. Id.(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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defendant's guilt in the underlying criminal action is a prerequisite to a
criminal forfeiture judgment.2' It is, therefore, unclear as to how the
Court will harmonize these two aspects of criminal forfeiture in the future.
Few would object to the forfeiture of the illegal materials and any illgotten gains, including the proceeds derived therefrom. The difficulty
arises when the sale of seven obscene items is permitted to serve as the
basis for the destruction of more than 100,000 books, magazines, and
videotapes and the forfeiture of all of the shops and vehicles owned by the
defendant, as well as nine million dollars.
There is an adage that a truly democratic society must find a proper
balance between freedom and security. In a completely free society, no
one is safe. In a truly safe society, no one is free. It is hoped that, on
remand, the permissive nature of forfeiture's history will not close the
lower court's eyes to what amounts to a blatant abuse of governmental
power and prevent it from striking a balance between our desire for
security and our need for freedom. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our
stars, But in ourselves .
. ,"I Cloaking outrageous behavior in the
clothes of a free and safe society must not become our excuse to regress
back to the "good ol' days" when kings were gods and we were safe from
everyone, except ourselves.
Im. PRETRIAL RESTRAINT OF SuBSTITuTE ASSETS

Mention should be made of what promises to be one of the next issues
for the Supreme Court to address in the forfeiture context, namely, the
pretrial restraint of substitute assets.
Congress has empowered the courts to order the forfeiture of any
property belonging to the defendant, up to the value of the subject
property, in lieu of such property.'
These are substitute assets, that
is, assets that bear no relationship to the criminal activity but which can
be used to satisfy a forfeiture judgment if the assets relating to the crime
have already been dissipated. This sounds a lot like a money judgment,
and has been analyzed as such.
In In re Assets of Billman, the court examined the question of
whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the
242. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
243. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, at 584 (The Shakespeare
Head Press Oxford ed., Dorset Press 1988).
244. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988). But cf.United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092,
1097 (11th Cir.) (limiting maximum amount of substitute property forfeiture to amount
prosecution could show defendant actually paid for property used in crime), reh'gdenied
en banc, 907 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1990).
245. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
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affirmative. With an eye toward the "remedial purposes" of the forfeiture
statute? notwithstanding the literal language of the statute and the
provision's legislative history, 7 the court read the provision allowing
for a restraining order in conjunction with the substitute assets provision
and concluded that together the provisions called for the preservation and
The court said that "a
restraint of substitute assets pending trial.'
forfeiture money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant's
assets." 9 Because RICO forfeitures constitute in personam punishment,
and because a final forfeiture judgment could be satisfied from any of a
defendant's assets, the court reasoned that the pre-conviction restraint
provisions must be construed broadly to accomplish the purpose of
preserving, before trial, all assets that might ultimately be subject to
The Second Circuit used
forfeiture, including substitute assets.'

similar reasoning in United States v. Regan
1963(m)(5).252

1

to interpret 18 U.S.C. §

246. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (1988) ("The provisions of this section shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
247. See S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.18 (1982). As part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-13,
the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, was amended with what appeared to be clear and
unambiguous provisions. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) dealt with pretrial restraint, expressly
limiting its application to traceable proceeds. By contrast, substitute assets were included
only in subsection (p), which characterizes assets forfeitable following conviction.
248. Bilbnan, 915 F.2d at 921; see also United States v. Swank Corp., 797 F.
Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1992); United States v. Skiles, 715 F. Supp. 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain
"additional" assets, pre-trial, to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture).
249. Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798,
800-03 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986)).
250. Id.
251. 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
252. Id. at 121. The court stated in dictum:
Although [18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(5)] concerns the ultimate forfeiture, it surely
suggests that restraining orders entered before forfeiture should be concerned
with preserving assets equivalent in value to the potentially forfeitable
property, and not necessarily the precise property. We believe, therefore, that
where the nature of the defendants' forfeitable property makes the imposition
of a restraining order burdensome on third parties, the district court should,
as an alternative, restrain [substitute] assets of the defendant equal in value to
that of the unrestrained forfeitable property.
d.; see also In re Assets of Parent Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 248, 255-56 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (assuming that § 1963(m) substitute assets can be subject to pretrial restraints).
Section 1963(n)(5) has been relettered, and is now § 1963(m)(5).
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The constitutionality of restraining "substitute assets" has been
affirmed by several district courts.3 The rationale presented is that it
must "ensure the fullest possible satisfaction of any forfeiture order that
the court ultimately might order."'
Any other reading of the statute
would "circumvent Congress's express intent by disposing of forfeitable
assets between the time of indictnent and the time of trial." 5 That
result, the courts have held, is not justifiable.'
Recently, however, the Third, Fifth and Ninth circuits have rejected
the reasoning of Biliman and held that substitute assets cannot be seized
prior to trial. In United States v. Floyd, 7 the Fifth Circuit found that
18 U.S.C. § 853(a) "plainly states what property may be restrained before
trial" and does not include substitute assets.25
"To allow the
government to freeze... untainted assets would require us to interpret
the phrase 'property described in subsection (a)' to mean property
described in subsection (a) and (). " 11
A contrary holding would not only violate the statute's plain language
and legislative intent, but might also raise constitutional issues. As the
unanimous Floyd court held:
The government's contention that it has the power to seize

property that is not evidence of a crime nor the fruits of a crime
hints of writs of assistance. At the least it poses Fourth
253. See United States v. Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1993); United
States v. Floyd, 814 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) allows government to apply for pretrial restraint of
substitute assets that would be subject to post-conviction forfeiture under § 8 53 (p));
United States v. Swank Corp., 797 F. Supp. 497, 501 (E.D. Va. 1992). But see United
States v. Chinn, 687 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that assets defendant
acquired prior to any alleged involvement with RICO enterprise could not be restrained
under RICO prior to conviction, although such assets could be subject to forfeiture upon
conviction). The Chinn decision, however, pre-dated the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Billnan, and the Bilbman court expressly criticized the Chinn court's reasoning. See
Billman, 915 F.2d at 919.
254. Wu, 814 F. Supp. at 493.
255. Floyd, 814 F. Supp. at 1359; see Swank Corp., 797 F. Supp. at 501 (stating
court has "no choice but to continue to restrain assets . . . if there is to be any
reasonable likelihood that an order of forfeiture against [defendant] could ever be
satisfied"); Skiles, 715 F. Supp. at 1567.
256. Floyd, 814 F. Supp. at 1359.
257. 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.), rev'g 814 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
258. Id. at 502.
259. Id. (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1), the substantive terms of which are in
material part identical to those under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)).
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Amendment concerns sufficient to avert any temptation we might
have to engage in interpretative handsprings to effectuate a
legislative purpose the Congress did not express.m°
In In re Assets of Martin,"1 the Third Circuit joined the Fifth
Circuit in disallowing substitute assets as part of pre-trial RICO restraints
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) and (d), the
on tainted property.'
court held:
We, like the Floyd court, find the plain language of the
statute so clearly dispositive that ordinarily we would not consider
legislative history. However, in light of the circumstance that our
result conflicts with Billman, we have examined the legislative
history, which demonstrates, were there any doubt, that the Floyd
court's reading of the statutory language is correct.m
According to the Martin court, Billman found, ' and Regan
suggested,' that the congressional purpose underlying asset forfeitures
would demand that pre-conviction and pre-indictment restraints include
subsection (m) substitute assets, as well as the subsection (a) assets
"However, legislative history establishes the
specified in the statute.'
contrary-a clear congressional purpose to exempt subsection (m)
substitute assets from any pre-conviction or pre-indictment restraints."'
In Martin, "a statute obviously intended by Congress not to subject
substitute assets to the effect of pretrial restraints somehow was
metamorphosed by the government into a medium for reaching the
excluded assets.'
Finally, the court harmonized its result with the Supreme Court's
"cautious interpretation of the scope of forfeiture provisions" in Austin
and Alexander.? In Alexander, the majority found that forfeiture of the
defendant's bookstore businesses did not offend the First Amendment as
a prior restraint of speech because the forfeiture order only "deprive[d the
260. Id.
261. 1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993).
262. Id. at 1359.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 1358.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See id. at 1359.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1361 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1360.
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defendant] of specific assets that were found to be related to his previous
racketeering violations."' That rationale, the Martin court said, would
not support the forfeiture of § 1963(m) substitute assets if those assets
were expressive materials." The court stated: "Indeed, consideration
of forfeiture in the context of substitute assets, which was not required in
Alexander, might well support the argument of the Alexander dissenters
that, in some circumstances at least, forfeiture inappropriately is applied
to expressive materials without some prior determination of
obscenity."'
The court viewed the Austin decision as an attempt to "keep
" n
prosecutorial zeal for [forfeitures] within particular boundaries. 2
Going beyond the plain meaning of the statute would not further such a
purpose.
In United States v. Ripinsky, ' 4 the Ninth Circuit also used the plain
meaning of the statute to deny the pre-trial seizure of substituted
assets. 5 Employing "precisely the same" analysis relied upon by the
Floyd and Martin courts, the court held that "while § 853(o) does
'command for a liberal construction,' it does not 'authorize us to amend
by interpretation.'" ' 6 If Congress deems it appropriate to subject
substitute assets to pre-trial restraint, the court said, it can amend the
statute. 7 7
Questions remain.
For example, in United States v. Swank
Corp.," the court expressly left open whether the restraining of the
corporate assets of a businessman's privately owned corporation for a
relatively minor drug crime might violate the Eighth Amendment ban on
excessive fines. 9
Restraint of substitute assets also poses a threat to an individual's
rights under the Fifth and Sixth amendments. With the Third, Fifth and
Ninth circuits now at odds with the Second and Fourth circuits, it is hoped
that the Supreme Court will grant review and address this issue soon.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993).
Martin, 1 F.3d at 1360.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1361.
20 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 363.
Id. (quoting United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Id.

278. 797 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1992).
279. Id. at 504 (stating that nothing in its opinion "foreclose[d] the possibility that
a given use of the forfeiture statutes may violate the ExcessiveFines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment").
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IV. FORFEiuRE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment is not the only portion of the Bill of Rights
getting attention in the context of civil forfeiture. The Fifth Amendment's
grant of due process was the subject of a 1993 forfeiture-related opinion
from the Supreme Court.'
As we know, the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims, together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

govern the procedures in civil forfeiture proceedings. These rules are

detailed and old. Although many types of forfeiture were abolished by the
first Congress of the United States in 1790,-1 the forfeiture tradition
was maintained through the maritime and customs laws. This is why
some of the more powerful federal forfeiture laws today are codified in
the admiralty laws.'

One peculiarity amidst the particulars embedded in the rules is that

there is no requirement that an owner or party interested in property

subject to forfeiture be given notice or a hearing prior to the property's
seizure.'

Many circuit and district courts had authorized pre-seizure

concerned.'

4

notice and opportunity to be heard, at least where real property was
But in the centuries since our Constitution has protected

280. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
281. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3563).
282. See KESSLER, supra note 1, § 1.02 (discussing the historical perspective of
forfeiture).
283. For an excellent review of the law as it relates to the right to a pre-seizure
hearing, see United States v. 8215 Reese Rd., 803 F. Supp. 175, 178 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(discussing how pre-seizurejudicial notice and hearing might in some instances prejudice
the government and frustrate the objectives of forfeiture); see also United States v.
Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the government is authorized to seize
property without judicial process when the Attorney General has probable cause to
believe that property is subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1262-65 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied,
897 F.2d 659 (2d. Cir. 1990); Richmond Tenants Org., Inc., v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300,
1306-08 (4th Cir. 1992); 8215 Reese Rd., 803 F. Supp. at 178-79; United States v. 63236 Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1552 (N.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. 14128 S.
Sch. St., 774 F. Supp. 475, 478-80 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. 185 & 191
Whalley Ave., 774 F. Supp. 87, 89-91 (D. Conn. 1991); United States v. Certain Real
Property Located on Hanson Brook, 770 F. Supp. 722, 730 (D. Me. 1991); United States
v. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 509-11 (E.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Parcel
1, 731 F. Supp. 1348, 1352-53 (S.D. Ill. 1990); see also United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd on othergrounds, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1992)
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our citizens from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, the Supreme Court had never seen fit to extend these
protections to everyone. That, however, changed on December 13, 1993.
A. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property
On that date, in a 5-4 decision, the Court in United States v. James

Daniel Good Real Property) ruled that, absent exigent circumstances,

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government
to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing
real property subject to civil forfeiture.'
Distinguishing between

protections afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, both of which
may be implicated by the seizure of property, Justice Kennedy, writing for

the majority,'

rejected the government's argument that it need only

comply with the Fourth Amendment when seizing forfeitable property.' 8
According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment does place restrictions on
seizures conducted for purposes of civil forfeiture, but it does not follow

that the Fourth Amendment is the sole constitutional provision in
question.'
The Court held that when the government seizes property
not to preserve evidence of criminal wrongdoing but to assert ownership
and control over the property, thereby going "beyond the traditional

(stating in dicta that government's seizure may have been unlawful, but nonetheless this
did not require dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings provided that probable cause to
seize the premises could be supported by untainted evidence); Dep't of Law Enforcement
v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991). The courts that have held that due
process does not require notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of real
property in the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding have failed to engage in any
analysis or discussion of the governmental and private interests involved, or failed to
consider the significant differences between real property and personal property. See,
e.g., United States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 838 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir. 1986).
285. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
286. Id. at 505. The Court did not expressly address the requisite procedures for
pre-forfeiture seizures of real property in the context of criminal forfeiture under statutes
such as 21 U.S.C. § 853 and 18 U.S.C. § 1963. The Court noted, however, that such
seizures are reserved for situations in which the government "persuades a district court
that there is probable cause to believe that a protective order 'may not be sufficient to
assure the availability of the property for forfeiture.'" Id. n.3 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
853(t)).
287. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined in the majority
opinion.
288. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
289. Id. at 499 (citing 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696
(1965)) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture).
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meaning of search or seizure," the the government's action must also
comply with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments.
The facts relating to the criminal activity in Good were by most
accounts unexceptional. On January 31, 1985, Hawaii police officers
executed a search warrant at Good's home." The police recovered
about eighty-nine pounds of marijuana, marijuana seeds, vials containing
hashish oil, and drug paraphernalia.'
Six months later, Good pleaded
guilty to promotion of a harmful drug in the second degree, was sentenced
to one year in jail and five years' probation, and was fined $1000.1
Good also was forced to forfeit to the state $3187 in cash found on the
premises.? 4
Four and one-half years later, the United States filed an in rem action
in the district court, seeking forfeiture of Good's house and land, on the
ground that the property had been used to commit or facilitate the
commission of a federal drug offense. 5
Following an ex parte
proceeding, a United States Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing
the government to seize the property, which they did without either prior
notice to Good or an adversarial proceeding.?
In his claim for the
property and answer to the government's complaint, Good asserted that he
was deprived of his property without due process of law and that the
action was invalid because it had not been timely commenced.'
The
district court ordered the forfeiture of the property."
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that seizure without prior
notice and a hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.? 9 The court stated that before the government could seize
property, the owner had a due process right to notice and a hearing,
except in "extraordinary situations" which may require a "special need for
very prompt action."'
Finding very ordinary circumstances in the
290. Id. at 500.
291. Id. at 497.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The forfeiture was effectuated under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). Id.

296. Id. at 497-98.
297. Id. at 498.

298. Id.
299. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.
1992).
300. Id. at 1383 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)).
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seizure of Good's home, the court noted: "The house is not going
anywhere."" 1 The house could not "be driven away and... find itself
in another jurisdiction by sundown."'
The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 3
Justice Kennedy's opinion focused on the real property aspects of the
facts. After discussing the historical importance of property rights, the
Court distinguished its landmark opinion in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.,'
which involved the forfeiture of personal
property-a yacht-virtually without affording any constitutional
safeguards to the yacht's owner.'
The difference, Justice Kennedy
wrote, is that seizure of real property does not fall within the
"extraordinary situation" permitting seizure prior to notice and a hearing,
as defined in Mathews v. Eldridge." Only extraordinary circumstances
"where some valid governmental interest is at stake" can justify the failure
to provide pre-seizure notice and hearing in the context of a civil
forfeiture proceeding.'
In determining whether the exigent circumstances
exception-dispensing with notice and a hearing-applies in the context of
real property forfeiture, the Court applied the Mathews test."0 8 That test
includes four factors to be considered in determining whether due process
was afforded: (1) the significance of the property interest involved; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation given the procedures actually employed; (3)
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and (4) the
government's interest in pre-notice seizure.'
301. Id. at 1384.
302. Id. at 1382. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
action was untimely, although filed within the five-year period provided by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1621, because the government failed to follow the internal notification and reporting
requirements of §§ 1602-1604. Id. at 1384.
303. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 113 S. Ct. 1576 (1993).
304. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
305. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
306. Id. at 501 (applying the three-part test for determining the exception to the
general rule requiring pre-forfeiture notice and hearing set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976)). For the Mathews test, see infra text accompanying note 309.
307. Good, 114 S.Ct. at 501 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972),
quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see also Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677-80 & n.14 (1974).
308. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
309. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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In Good, each factor was addressed individually. 31 ° The Court
found that the defendant's right to maintain control over his home, and to
be free from governmental interference, was a private interest of historic
and continuing importance that weighed heavily in the Mathews balance
and, in the instant case, in favor of the defendant."' The seizure
deprived Good of "valuable rights of ownership, including the right of
sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and enjoyment,
and the right to receive rents. All that the seizure left him, by the
Government's own submission, was the right to bring a claim for the
return of title at some unscheduled future hearing.""1 Even if Good's
loss was "only" the monthly rental income from the house, "[i]t cannot
be classified as de minimis for purposes of procedural due process." 1 3
The Court then expressed concern that the practice of ex parte seizure
creates an unacceptable risk of error, since the proceeding affords little or
no protection to an innocent owner, who may not be deprived of property
under § 881(a)(7).314 Because the government, when seeking a warrant,
is not required to offer any evidence regarding the question of innocent
ownership or other potential defenses a claimant might have, "[flairness
can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive
of rights .... No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it.""'
Regarding the government's interest in seizing property before a
hearing, the Court found that, at least in the context of real property, the
governmental interest at stake does not present a "pressing need" for
prompt action.31 6 Because real property cannot abscond, a court's
jurisdiction can be preserved without prior seizure simply by posting
notice on the property and leaving a copy of the process with the
occupant. In addition, as a general matter, a showing of exigent
circumstances seems unlikely when a person's home is at stake because,
unlike some forms of property, a home cannot be readily moved or
310. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501-02.
311. Id. at 501.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.at 501-02.
315. Id. at 502 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted)).
316. Id.
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dissipated. 7 Moreover, the government's wait of four and one-half
years after discovering the unlawful use of the property before instituting
the forfeiture action belied any claim of exigency.
Another key to the Court's holding was the finding that the
government's legitimate interests at the inception of a forfeiture
proceeding-preventing the property from being sold, destroyed, or used
for further illegal activity before the forfeiture judgment-could be secured
through measures less intrusive than seizure, such as a Us pendens notice
to prevent the property's sale, a .restraining order to prevent its
destruction, and search and arrest warrants to forestall further illegal
activity.31 Because a claimant is already entitled to a hearing before
final judgment, requiring the government to postpone seizure until after
an adversary hearing creates no significant administrative burden.
Moreover, any harm from the delay is minimal compared to the injury
occasioned by erroneous seizure.
Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant
may not receive an adversary hearing until many months after the
seizure. And even if the ultimate judicial decision is that the
claimant was an innocent owner, or that the Government lacked
probable cause, this determination, coming months after the
seizure, "would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier
hearing might have prevented." 1
The Court concluded that no plausible claim of executive urgency,
including the government's reliance on forfeitures as a means of defraying
law enforcement expenses, justified the summary seizure of real property
under § 881(a)(7).1
The Court also addressed a statute of limitations issue, holding
unanimously that a forfeiture action filed within the statutory five-year
317. C. United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983) (holding that to
require federal customs officials to conduct a hearing "would make customs processing
entirely unworkable"); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,679
(1974) ("[P]reseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by
[forfeiture] statutes, since the property seized-as here, a yacht-will often be of a sort
that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance
warning of confiscation were given.").
318. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 503-04.
319. Id. at 502 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 3 (1991)).
320. Id. at 505.
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time period may not be dismissed on the basis of the government's failure
to comply with the internal timing requirements of the statute at issue. 321
Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent, ' in which they objected to "this ill-considered and disruptive
decision." '
Giving Mathews a narrow reading and interpreting CaleroToledo differently from the majority, the dissenters, looking at the issues
from a Fourth Amendment perspective, found it "paradoxical indeed to
hold that a criminal defendant can be temporarily deprived of liberty on
the basis of an ex parte probable cause determination, yet respondent
Good cannot be temporarily deprived of property on the same basis." 3 '
The dissent analogized this case to tax-related proceedings, stating that
since the Court had upheld pre-hearing seizures for "summary seizure of
property to collect the internal revenue of the United States," '
the
same should be done in Good. ' The majority's decision "does not
merely discard established precedence regarding excise taxes, but deals at
least a glancing blow to the authority of the Government to collect income
tax delinquencies by summary proceedings."'
Justice Rehnquist also objected to the limitation placed by the majority
on Calero-Toledo, stating that real property, like moveable property,
"could easily be destroyed or damaged to prevent [it] from falling into the
hands of the Government" if pre-seizure notice were required. ' He
expressed "grave doubts" as to whether the majority's decision would
alleviate the hardships of innocent individuals in civil forfeiture cases. 3'
"[W]hatever social benefits might flow from the decision are more than
offset by the damage to settled principles of constitutional law which are
inflicted to secure these perceived social benefits.""3°

321. Id. at 505-07. The Court held that Congress's failure to specify a consequence

for noncompliance with the timing requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 implied that
Congress did not intend to require dismissal of a forfeiture action for such

noncompliance. Id. at 507.
322. Id. at 507. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor filed a separate
dissent. Id. at 511-14. Justice Thomas also dissented separately. Id. at 515-17.
323. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 92 (1972)).
326. Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
328. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
330. Id.(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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B. The Impact of Good

The good part of Good is that, barring exceptional circumstances,
notice and a hearing are required prior to seizure of real property in

narcotics-related civil forfeiture cases.331

Providing an adversarial

hearing reduces the possibility that the government will seize the property

of innocent owners, 2 that it will seize property when the requisite
criminal activity has never occurred,333 that it will seize property without

sufficient nexus to criminal activity,' or that it will seize a tract of land
beyond that part of the land involved in the criminal activity.335 The
Due Process Clause's guarantee that the individual can argue his or her

case to a judge serves as a small but significant check against

governmental error.33
The Court also reconsidered the statement in Calero-Toledo that
governmental forfeitures are less suspect because they are "not initiated
by self-interested private parties." 337 As the Court noted regarding the
Good forfeiture, the government is a self-interested public party.3 38 The
Drug Enforcement Administration may share in the proceeds of forfeiture,
and the proceeds may be rebated to local authorities.3 39 As the Court
previously held in Harmelin v. Michigan,' "it makes sense to
scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to
331. Id. at 505.
332. United States v. 121 Van Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1029 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) ("Without... an opportunity [for a pre-seizure hearing] there would be a serious
risk that an owner or occupant could be erroneously deprived of a domicile.").
333. United States v. 110 Collier Drive, 793 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (N.D. Ala. 1992)
(holding that the amount of drugs found in a defendant's house and car did not support
a felony charge of drug possession under federal law).
334. United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that
evidence did not create a link between the property and drug trafficking substantial
enough to forfeit defendant's house). But see United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the government need not demonstrate a "substantial
connection" between the seized property and illegal drug activity to justify the seizure
of property, only a "nexus").
335. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492, 501-02 (1993).
336. See 121 Van NostrandAve., 760 F. Supp. at 1035 (holding that a claimant may
present affirmative defenses at a probable cause hearing).
337. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
338. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502.
339. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
340. 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991).
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benefit." 341 The Good decision may reduce the temptation and the
incentive for abuse by the government.
After Good, the Mathews test is better defined and it appears that
there is no longer any doubt that the Fifth Amendment applies to civil
forfeiture cases. There is more work for title insurers and their attorneys,
who must now begin drafting clauses to cover situations which will
become more common with the increase in litigation stemming from
Good.
There are, however, other pieces to the decision which might be of
importance to the practitioner. For example, what is the scope of the
hearing? Will the government be permitted to establish probable cause
based exclusively on hearsay evidence such as affidavits? If so, the
hearing would be meaningless.'" Because "[a] fundamental requirement
of due process is 'the opportunity to be heard,'"'343 lack of an adversarial
hearing on the restraint issue would constitute a violation of due
process.'
At the very least, the government should be required to
present the witnesses whose testimony supports the affidavits.
V. CONCLUSION

In Good, Justice Kennedy framed succinctly the most important issue
in forfeiture cases: "The question before us is the legality of the seizure,
not the strength of the Government's case."'
Often, prosecutors and
judges are distracted by the facts of the underlying criminal activity. This
opinion, focusing on procedures in a case filed years after the defendant
had completed serving his sentence, highlights what criminal practitioners
have known all along: Constitutional protections and fair procedures are
not confined to the innocent alone. This, coupled with the Court's
341. Id. at 2693 n.9.
342. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191 (2d Cir.) (holding that
due process requires a pre-trial, post-attachment hearing in order to continue restraining
assets needed to retain counsel of choice), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 383 (1991).
343. Id. at 1195 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). The
Second Circuit further found that the opportunity to be heard must be granted "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. at 1198 (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
344. Id. at 1195; see also United States v. Milan-Colon, 836 F. Supp. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
345. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
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decision in Austin that civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) are punitive and subject to the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, places civil forfeiture proceedings
in their proper context. 7 The Court has seen the quacking duck of
civil forfeiture for what it really is: a criminal punishment in which the
claimant/owner/mortgagee/lienholder should be able to stand before the
court with rights and protections comparable to those given to citizens who
are subject to loss of life or liberty, those other two protections guaranteed
under the Fifth Amendment. As the majority in Good stated:
The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the
Constitution's command of due process. "The purpose of this
requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the
individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use
and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to
minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of
property .... "I
As the Norwegians might say: La lekene begynne! [Let the games begin!]

346. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); see also Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (deeming the Eighth Amendment a possible prohibition
to a RICO forfeiture when the scope of the forfeiture would be "grossly
disproportionate" to the criminal misconduct involving the enterprises' assets).
347. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
348. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500-01 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81
(1972)).

